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Abstract
This paper’s aim is to research into the variation in effective tax rates among local 
jurisdictions of two regions of Ukraine, Ivano-Frankivsk and Vinnitsa, in order to get new 
insights into the peculiarity of inter-location fiscal competition in the context of a transi-
tional economy. It is argued that, despite a highly centralized taxation system, the room 
for inter-jurisdictional tax competition is somewhat limited, at least with regard to a uni-
fied small business tax for natural persons. This competition could take on a very speci-
fic shape because it is closely related to the issue of hidden economy. The study demon-
strates that local fiscal policy has a potential to affect the number of business units regi-
stered in a specific jurisdiction.
Keywords: fiscal autonomy, tax rate discretion, unified small business tax, Ukraine 
1 Introduction
Local governments’ revenues in any country consist of own and ceded national taxes, 
consumer payments and state grants of various kinds. The actual combination of diffe-
rent revenue types in the local government budget is to a great extent determined by the 
historical development of the respective country. Here, economies in transition provide a 
very good example of how the revenue system characteristic of the command economy 
transforms into one which is consistent with the market economy and decentralized deci-
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sion-making. This process usually takes some time. As noted in many studies1, a high de-
pendence on central government grants and low fiscal discretion is very typical of tran-
sition economies.
Revenue assignment in a multi-level state could be a specific mixture of elements be-
longing to different revenue systems. In Ukraine, the local government revenue system 
is based on the separation of revenues (with some national taxes like personal income tax 
(PIT) allocated to sub-national governments) combined with donations and contributi-
ons. In its main components, this revenue system could be characterized as a very centra-
lized one, despite the fact that some kinds of revenue allocated to local governments dis-
play characteristics which create opportunities for horizontal fiscal competition among 
jurisdictions; namely those towards which local governments have some kind of tax rate 
discretion. The only question lies in the scale of such revenue types, which is a key issue 
for local fiscal autonomy.
Enjoying a certain degree of fiscal discretion, local governments could exercise some 
influence on local economic development. One of the important mechanisms employed in 
many countries throughout the world could be simplified taxation applied to small busi-
ness. Using the simplified taxation model local authorities could, on the one hand, make 
shadow economic activity less attractive to small and micro-entrepreneurs and, on the 
other hand, make such businesses contribute to the funding of local public goods provi-
sion. At the same time, local tax discretion creates prerequisites for attracting business 
units to a specific location. 
Horizontal fiscal competition among local governments could be viewed as a type of 
behavior of territorial units aimed at attracting more taxpayers through offering them favo-
rable tax regimes. As a result of unrestricted competition, tax rates tend to diminish and in 
extreme cases such a policy could (at least theoretically) result in zero rates and a collap-
se of local public finance. But self-interested rational taxpayers are not only interested in 
having lower tax burdens, but also in maximizing their utility. The latter means that they 
prefer to have the best possible benefit-cost combination with regard to local public good 
consumption. This fact prevents local governments from decreasing tax rates to zero. 
At the same time, being dependent on central government grants, local governments 
could compete not only for taxpayers, but also for fiscal assistance granted by the central 
government. Under certain conditions, this could trigger distortion of local revenues with 
tax revenues approaching zero. As Musgrave (1961) showed, this could be the case when 
the intergovernmental transfer system is based on the ‘pure equalization scheme’ with an 
equalization approach based on actual equalization of tax proceeds. This kind of fiscal 
competition could be treated as ‘indirect tax competition’ where local governments bring 
down tax rates because they seek to be free-riders in getting access to the equalization 
funds accumulated by the central government through their mandatory contributions.
The scale and scope of tax competition greatly depend on local tax discretion and fac-
tor mobility. In a system of fully independent local authorities and with no mobility cost, 
the result will be similar to the one described in Tiebout’s pioneering paper (1956). The 
Tiebout hypothesis concerned only private households and was built on a set of very re-
1 See e.g. Bird et al (1995), Davey (2002), Horvath (2000), Sevic (2006), Slukhai (2005). 51
S. Slukhai: Inter-Location Small Business Tax Rate Variation in Ukraine: What Is Behind It?
Financial Theory and Practice 33 (1) 49-71 (2009)
strictive assumptions which are not to be observed in a real world full of various imperfec-
tions. A transition economy adds more to these imperfections due to its incompleteness.
Here, in addition to the wide-spread non-market behavior of private economic agents, 
we see a very imperfect public sector with highly limited local revenue and expenditure 
discretion accompanied by low factor mobility. This is an obvious characteristic of the 
Ukrainian transition economy where there is no public sector tradition and factor mar-
kets function very inefficiently (some of them are non-extant like the market of land in-
tended for cultivation) because of the deeply rooted regulative syndrome pursued by the 
central government, accompanied by weak economic institutions. That is why it would 
be interesting to see whether a limited local government fiscal autonomy triggers mobi-
lity of economic agents even under such peculiar circumstances.
It is worth mentioning that economists, while dealing with fiscal competition issues, 
do not pay much attention to the size and structure of the companies involved. However, 
this issue is of high importance because it has behavioral implications. E.g. multinational 
corporations could effectively use the international tax rate differentials in order to mini-
mize tax burden; big companies with divisions spread over different localities could cho-
ose the place of their registered offices for local taxation purposes. The case below hig-
hlights some issues of fiscal competition in the case of very small companies which are 
therefore not sufficiently mobile.  
Until now, fiscal competition in Ukraine has been beyond the scope of academic re-
search. The same relates to other post-Soviet countries: despite several publications dedi-
cated to fiscal competition in Russia (Besstremiannaya 2001; Libman & Feld 2007; So-
lanko 2001) the topic in general still requires more detailed research. 
In order to bridge this gap, the situation with inter-location tax rate differentiation 
between two regions, Ivano-Frankivsk and Vinnitsa, has been studied, which resulted in 
getting some insight into the specifics of inter-location fiscal competition in a transition 
economy context.
The study below is structured in the following way. First, it summarizes modern de-
velopments in the fiscal competition theory concerning local governments. Then it hig-
hlights the general issues of local fiscal discretion in Ukraine. After that it presents the 
characteristics of a specific tax which, as suggested, plays a role in triggering tax compe-
tition – a unified small business tax for natural persons. Finally, the actual potential and 
prospects of fiscal competition are evaluated, followed by a conclusion.
2 Approaches to fiscal competition
From the viewpoint of private economic agents, fiscal competition among jurisdicti-
ons has two dimensions: intra-national and international. From our perspective, the intra-
national competition is the major concern. Fiscal competition among local governments 
within a national economy could be much more intense in comparison to that among in-
dividual countries because local governments are smaller in size in comparison to an en-
tire nation and the marginal influence of taxpayer reallocation has serious fiscal consequ-
ences for the governments involved.52
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The first attempt to apply a competition model to the provision of local public goods 
was presented in a pioneering article by Tiebout (1956). Based on local governments’ au-
tonomous decision making concerning revenues and expenditures under consumer prefe-
rence heterogeneity, combined with the absence of mobility costs, spillovers, and perfect 
information Tiebout constructed a model later referred to as ‘voting with feet’: perfectly 
mobile consumers choose the place of dwelling by looking for the best benefit/cost com-
bination related to local public good provision; this will enhance social welfare through 
generating a social optimum with regard to public goods.
Tiebout’s approach unleashed a flood of literature2. Some researchers criticized the 
approach claiming that the constraints under which it was developed were not realistic. 
Others tried to find empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis. The follow-up stu-
dies also demonstrated that, in contrast to Tiebout’s idea, fiscal competition among local 
governments tends to be destructive as concerns public good delivery.
One of the first empirical tests was undertaken by Oates (1969) who concluded that 
consumers really care about local benefits of public good provision and related tax bur-
den when choosing location. 
Very soon Tiebout’s model was extended to the entrepreneurial sector. So Oates and 
Schwab (1988) concluded that municipalities try to attract new businesses by offering a 
combination of local tax rates and local infrastructure services. In the case of homogeno-
us jurisdictions the capital tax rate will tend to be zero. The approach used by Oates and 
Schwab was based on property evaluation as a measure of benefits received by the po-
pulation from the local government activities, but this measure cannot directly reflect the 
price to be paid for the public goods provided. Ellson (1980) concluded from empirical 
data on the U.S. metropolitan areas that the Tiebout-type mobility could be counteracted 
by some economic factors like household income size or type of area.
The Tiebout hypothesis was tested not only on the USA, but also on some European 
countries with high regional government fiscal discretion, like Switzerland which pro-
vide quite obvious evidence concerning the negative influence of tax competition on tax 
rates. So it was found that tax competition among metropolitan areas levels out tax rates 
making them less progressive (Hodler & Schmidheiny, 2006).
The researchers expanded the Tiebout’s approach in different ways, while elimina-
ting some of its restrictive assumptions. It was found out that tax competition creates fis-
cal externalities and could be offset by spillovers. E.g. Buchanan and Goetz (1972) stre-
ssed the role of fiscal externalities stemming from shifting population among jurisdic-
tions. Bjorvatn and Schjelderup (2002) concluded that spillovers reduce the role of tax 
competition.
Following the idea of a harmful manifestation of tax competition as a ‘race to the 
bottom’ first mentioned by Oates (1972), Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) used another 
approach different from the one by Tiebout. They ruled out heterogeneity of consumer 
preferences in their model, introduced horizontal and vertical externalities, and tried to 
analyze a more complex world with both households (immobile) and companies (mobi-
2 For an extensive overview of literature, see Marsh & Kay (2004); Ribstein & Kobayashi (2006), Wilson 
(1999).53
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le). The latter consider locally provided public goods as a production factor. They demon-
strated that, under perfect competition conditions, distortionary property taxation would 
diminish the level of local public goods provision at both local and national levels, and in 
comparison to a head tax. As a result of fiscal competition, reduction in lump-sum pro-
perty tax on mobile capital would bring down the level of local public services delivered 
both to individuals and companies. 
The follow-up research done e.g. by Dhillon et al (2006) verified these conclusions 
and made some extensions: depending on model assumptions, tax competition could bring 
either an efficient or an inefficient result (the latter could be both underproduction and 
overproduction of public goods).
Wildasin (2003) draws special attention to factor mobility which could place major 
constraints on the local governments’ abilities to derive additional revenue from taxation 
in a dynamic framework. His theoretical model in its static and dynamic variants proves 
that in a world of public goods provided under perfect competition conditions (when fac-
tors are perfectly mobile, local governments are very small and do not demonstrate stra-
tegic behavior), the local capital tax rates will tend to be zero. But breaking any of con-
ditions mentioned above will lead to non-zero distorting taxation.
Some researchers have shown that tax competition may contribute to shifts in the 
composition of private revenue. So Fuest and Weichenrieder (2002) show that tax com-
petition through decreasing tax rates induces people to shift revenue sources to corporate 
income. There is a body of literature exploring the interaction between intergovernmen-
tal transfers and local tax policy. Musgrave (1961) pioneered the analysis of interaction 
between the fiscal equalization scheme and the local tax burden. He concluded that equa-
lization methods in a federal system are not neutral to local tax efforts. In the extreme, as 
in the case of actual outlays equalization, the local rates will go down to zero. The theo-
retical fiscal assistance schemes he introduced include some possibilities to prevent local 
governments from diminishing the taxation level and thus preserve the appropriate pu-
blic good supply.
Following his ideas, some researchers considered the state grant policy as a means of 
restoring efficiency damaged by tax competition. Bucovetsky, Marchand, and Pestieau 
(1998) concluded that state grant policies could improve the inefficiencies produced by 
tax competition. One of the recent studies by Hauptmeier (2006) showed that grant po-
licies could influence the local government spending patterns (which, under the conditi-
on of limited revenue discretion, could comprise an important means of horizontal fiscal 
competition) and offset the negative manifestations of fiscal externalities.
Despite of extensive literature on fiscal competition in developed economies, there 
are very few studies dedicated to it in the transition economy context; most of them are 
dedicated to Russia. One of the very first was a paper by Solanko (2002) who concluded 
that interregional tax competition seems to be less harmful in a transitional context than 
in the classical tax competition models. Another study worth mentioning is a paper by 
Libman & Feld (2007), dedicated to analyzing deviations in regional tax effort as an in-
strument of fiscal competition within a fiscally centralized country, showing that regio-54
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nal governments in Russia could manipulate tax auditing efforts in order to de facto de-
centralize the public finance system.
To sum up, we could say that fiscal competition is a fact which arises from local fiscal 
autonomy. As the body of research above showed, it has both advantages and disadvan-
tages as concerns local public good provision: it could enhance public sector efficiency 
through making local governments more sensitive to local demands, but it could also be 
distorting through creating incentives for local governments to hunt for extra taxpayers; 
the latter kind of behavior would generate negative fiscal externalities resulting in dimi-
nishing local tax rates and related problems with funding public outlays. To quote Wilson 
(1999, p. 298), “As such, competition has both good and bad aspects, the importance of 
which varies across the attributes of the goods and services the governments provide”. 
There are of course some mechanisms that could limit harmful manifestations of fis-
cal competition and the most important one could be, as Musgrave (1997) noted, fiscal 
coordination. The practical issues with diminishing harmful manifestations of tax compe-
tition in some spheres were discussed, e.g., in papers by Brøchner et al. (2006) – the cor-
porate tax coordination within the EU, and by Evers et al. (2004) – issues of diesel exci-
se competition within the EU. Hence, fiscal competition in the public sector must be in 
some way limited by constraints imposed by the central government on local fiscal dis-
cretion, by local authorities themselves by voluntarily deciding upon tax harmonization, 
and by local population by making local governments more accountable.
3 Local revenue discretion in Ukraine
So far there have been no studies dedicated to tax competition in Ukraine. The rea-
sons are rooted in peculiarities of the local revenue system which is, as in many other uni-
tary states, highly centralized in all its components. 
The dominating tax revenues of local governments in Ukraine after the budgetary re-
form in 2001 are the ceded central government revenues, the most important of which is 
PIT that comprises about 30 per cent of local governments’ total revenues on average and 
is distributed among regional, district and city/village governments in fixed proportions. 
As shown in Table 1, there are actually no true local revenues in Ukraine over which they 
have a substantial degree of discretion.
There are only a few duties which can increase the revenues-raising capacities of local 
governments. These include local taxes (the list laid down in the legislation includes 16 
duties of different types, all with quite a limited possibility of setting tax rates) and the 
unified small business tax (UT). Taken together, these two accounted for barely 2.6 per 
cent of total revenues from the aggregate sub-national sector in 2006. 
The real discretion over these two sources of revenue is not very high for two reasons: 
(i) the minimum and maximum tax rates are set by legislation and (ii) local governments 
have no possibility to discipline bad payers. Tax administration in Ukraine is centralized 
– local governments do not have their own tax administrations and this fact makes it al-
most impossible to monitor taxpayers located in the territory under their jurisdiction. All 
duties are collected by the State Tax Administration offices having no motivation to disc-55
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lose the information on taxpayers who are in arrears to the respective local budgets3 – and 
local governments do not even keep registers of local taxpayers, fully relying on the fiscal 
departments of regional and district state administrations in estimating and planning their 
revenues. That is why strategic tax auditing and collection could hardly be an instrument 
of fiscal competition among local governments as is usual in many federal countries, in-
cluding Russia (see Libman and Feld, 2007). 
Generally, it should be recognized that the real discretion of local governments over 
revenues in Ukraine is extremely low4 and, broadly, their ability to affect the return to the 
local revenue base seems to be very weak. The long-lasting debates about granting them 
more revenue discretion by imposing a local property tax that could greatly improve their 
revenue positions have not brought any positive results so far.
However, there are some fiscal instruments which could be treated as local discretio-
nary instruments. They primarily include regionally-motivated central tax privileges and 
value added tax (VAT) reimbursements. According to empirical evidence, several (most 
3 The real situation in this field was analyzed in a research paper produced by AUF (2003).  
4 The same is also true for other transitional economies. See e.g. Zhuravskaya (2000) about low revenue discre-
tion of the cities in Russia. 
Table 1.   Shares of some local revenues in total revenues (including transfers) and 
respective degrees of local discretion (2006)
Duty Share in local 
total 
revenues
Discretion concerning
legislating tax-base 
setting
tax-rate 
setting
Personal income tax 30.0 No No No
Corporate profits tax 0.4 No No No
Motor vehicle tax  1.4 No No No
Land tax and land rent 4.1 No No limited
Excises 0.1 No No No
License fees 0.7 No No No
Trade patents 1.0 No No No
Local taxes 0.8 very limited No limited
Fixed agricultural tax 0.2 No No No
Unified small business tax  1.8 No No limited
Non-tax revenues 6.3 partly n/a n/a
Capital gains 3.5 Yes n/a n/a
Targeted funds 1.9 Yes n/a n/a
Official transfers 45.0 No n/a n/a
Source: Authors’ calculation and estimation based on the Ministerstvo Finansiv Ukrayiny (2007).56
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developed) regions in Ukraine attract tax privileges out of proportion with their contribu-
tion to the national economy (NDFI 2004). 
Disproportions in VAT compensation “chill and demoralize the competitive envi-
ronment”, as head of the State Tax Administration recently noted (Bilousova 2008). E.g. 
enterprises in the Donetsk region cashed 93.3 per cent of VAT reimbursement claims 
in 2007, whereas enterprises located in Kyiv region only 50 per cent. The prevalence of 
such a situation could be attributed to ‘state capture’ at the central level where the most 
powerful business clans make the central state authorities give them hidden additional 
tax advantages with respect to the place of their business operations. However, there are 
no such possibilities at the local level, because VAT proceeds are fully allocated to the 
central government budget.
The low revenue discretion does not mean that there is no potential for fiscal compe-
tition among local authorities at all. Fiscal competition concerns some specific types of 
their revenues. Being limited in their ability to attract more taxpayers through manipulating 
locally set tax rates, they compete for vertical state transfers, which are numerous: equa-
lization grants, additional donations for social infrastructure maintenance and earmarked 
grants of different types. The higher-level sub-national authorities (regions and districts) 
do have some degree of formal discretion over these revenue types. E.g. each regional 
authority adopts a methodology of allocating equalization grants to the basic-level local 
governments – cities, towns and villages, but this methodology is to be implemented by 
district authorities which actually employ a discretionary (ad hoc) approach for the dis-
tribution of equalization money among subordinated governments, trying to maintain the 
existing social infrastructure. Assuming that 92 per cent of local governments in Ukra-
ine receive equalization grants and that the average share of total grants in the revenues 
of aggregated local governments in the Ivano-Frankivsk and Vinnitsa regions exceeds 60 
per cent (and even more for the basic-level governments in rural areas), it would be rea-
sonable for them to compete in order to make the revenues included in this dominating 
share as large as possible. This is more or less true for all regions of Ukraine. This kind 
of competition could be both formal (when local governments require the fiscal authori-
ties to provide them with grants pursuant to regulations) and informal (when some local 
administrators establish personal relations to their superiors).
Nevertheless, can we assume that low fiscal discretion and inherent vertical fiscal 
competition make horizontal fiscal competition among local governments impossible? 
There is no definite answer to this question, because, as shown before, some levies accru-
ing to territorial budgets are subject to a certain degree of local government discretion 
concerning the rates and therefore the local governments may be involved in some sort of 
horizontal fiscal competition. And the best candidate for revealing tax competition could 
be one of the levies of this kind – the unified small business tax (UT). It is worth mentio-
ning that the relative importance of this levy for sub-regional level governments is quite 
high. E.g. its share in cities of regional significance was about 5 per cent of total tax re-
venues excluding intergovernmental grants in 2006 (rank # 3 among tax proceeds collec-
ted), in cities of district significance 12 per cent (rank # 2), in townships 9 per cent (rank 
# 3) and in villages 7 per cent (rank # 3). 57
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This is why we may assume that this tax could reflect at least some degree of com-
petition among jurisdictions. As shown in the next chapter, the structure of this tax gives 
grounds for such an assumption.
Since the tax in question is levied on small businesses, Wildasin’s note concerning the 
limited role of a local government’s fiscal instruments will not hold. As was noted, “The 
exposure of local governments to external markets means that tax, transfer, and other re-
distributive policies involving mobile factors of production are ineffective because the 
net returns of these factors are determined in markets whose geographical scope extends 
beyond that of any single locality” (Wildasin 2003, p. 2571). But this is not true for small 
businesses whose geographical scope is mostly limited to a city or even village where the 
respective business unit is registered: in Ukraine, small businesses registered as sole pro-
prietorships are mostly localized in the entrepreneur’s home community. It could be sug-
gested that in such a situation local fiscal policy concerning taxing small businesses may 
result in differing tax rates imposed on payers by their respective governments.
4 Basic features of the Ukrainian unified small business tax
Like many other transitional countries as well as developed ones, Ukraine uses a 
simplified taxation approach in order to make small businesses contribute to the funding 
of public expenditures. The unified small business tax was introduced by the Presiden-
tial Decree (1998) in order to give way to legalization of small business units which had 
very strong motivation to escape taxation through non-registration under common busi-
ness tax regime.  
According to the Presidential Decree on the Simplified System of Taxation, Accoun-
ting and Reporting System for Small Business Entities (issued in 1998, amended),5 small 
businesses in most fields of economic activity6 were given the right of switching to UT, 
instead of paying separately VAT, EPT, PIT, land tax, trade patent fee, trade permit fee, 
and contributions to social security and pension funds, some local taxes and duties, etc. 
The small businesses which are eligible can be both natural and legal persons.
The most important provisions of the Decree could be summarized in the following 
way. 
•   Eligible small businesses (sole proprietorships) which hire up to 10 employees and 
whose annual turnover does not exceed UAH (Ukrainian currency unit) 500,000 may 
choose to pay unified small business tax for natural persons (UTNP). Lump sum 
tax rates are annually set by the local councils where the business units are registe-
red within a range between UAH 20 and 200 per month. In the case of performing 
various activities which are taxed at different rates, a business entity pays the tax at 
a maximum rate set by the local council. Hiring people or employing family mem-
bers will result in a higher tax rate – it will be calculated according to the formula
5 It should be substituted by a permanent legal act (Law on the Simplified System of Taxation), but the legisla-
tors have still not had time to deal with this. 
6 The following business activities are not eligible for simplified taxation: gambling, lotteries, currency exchange, 
production of excisable goods, production and selling of jewelry. 58
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T = t (1 + 0.5n), where T is monthly tax obligation, t is basic tax rate set by the local 
council, n – number of employed persons (the entrepreneur himself excluded).7
•   Eligible small businesses (legal persons) which hire no more than 50 employees and 
whose annual turnover does not exceed UAH 1,000,000 may also switch to unifi-
ed small business tax. They can choose between two options: (i) paying a unified 
small business tax for legal persons (UTLP) at a rate of 6 per cent of their turnover 
in case they decide to pay VAT but not excises on domestically produced goods, 
and (ii) 10 per cent of turnover in case they choose not to pay VAT, but to pay exci-
ses on domestically produced goods.
•   Local governments retain 23 per cent of the total UTLP amount collected; the rest 
goes to the state budget (20 per cent), State Pension Fund (42 per cent) and state so-
cial security funds (15 per cent); as concerns UTNP, local governments retain 43 
per cent, with the same shares for State Pension Fund and state social security funds. 
The UT proceeds are assigned to the local budget revenue basket dedicated to fund 
the functions delegated by the central government and taken into account while cal-
culating the equalization grant amount.
From the legal provisions summarized above we can draw the following conclusions.
•   Ukraine practices a dual approach to simplified small business taxation, using a 
lump sum rate as concerns natural persons (this is also characteristic of many CEE 
countries) and a fixed proportional rate as concerns legal persons (this is characte-
ristic of most “old” EU countries).
•   As concerns UTLP, there is actually no discretion for local governments to vary tax 
rates because the tax rate schedule is set by law and taxpayers can freely choose the 
rate according to their own benefit calculus.
•   As concerns UTNP, there is some room for local government’s tax rate discreti-
on because the legislation only sets the tax rate margins and, unlike in many other 
European transition countries, allows local governments to decide upon setting tax 
rates for different economic activities within these margins. The taxpayers are only 
free to choose between switching to the UTNP at its current rate and paying all co-
mmon business taxes.
In view of all above said, it follows that the Ukrainian UTNP is in essence a source-
based lump-sum tax on business and should generate no economic distortions for econo-
mic agents in terms of their input-output decisions. Additionally, its burden could hardly 
be exported to other jurisdictions because goods are traded mainly on the local market. 
However, in many cases this tax can be treated as a residence-based tax, as sole proprie-
torships are mainly registered at their home addresses. Since the subject of tax (a registe-
red business unit) is of restricted mobility, it is expected that there will be quite signifi-
cant differentiation in tax rates among different jurisdictions.  
Given the competitive market structure and quite elastic demand in big cities, small 
businesses are not in the position to shift the tax burden to consumers by raising prices. 
7 It is worth noting that the officially recorded number of hired employees is very low – less than one person 
per business unit on average. 59
S. Slukhai: Inter-Location Small Business Tax Rate Variation in Ukraine: What Is Behind It?
Financial Theory and Practice 33 (1) 49-71 (2009)
That is why raising the UTNP rates in cities will not have any significant impact on pri-
ces.
As concerns tax administration, it is centralized and local governments bear no ad-
ministrative cost, which is only involved in decision-making on tax rates. As a matter of 
fact, UTNP is highly cost-effective even from the taxpayers’ perspective, due to its very 
simple procedure: taxpayers just have to transfer a fixed amount of tax once a month wi-
thout any special checking procedure.
Comparing the Ukrainian UTNP with the small business taxation practices in Croa-
tia (see Blažić, Dimitrić, and Škalamera-Alilović 2006), one must admit that the Ukraini-
an UTNP looks much more attractive for small businesses to be chosen as an alternative 
to a common taxation regime for several reasons: (i) the turnover limit for switching to 
UTNP is six times higher in Ukraine compared with that in Croatia (due to current exc-
hange rates; the price parity difference which is significantly in favor of Ukraine is left 
out here); (ii) the tax base has no connection with the nationwide pay level; and (iii) the 
checking procedure is very simple. 
Taking all of the above into account, one can understand why virtually all registered 
sole proprietorships eligible for UTNP in Ukraine opt for such an opportunity, whereas 
their number in Croatia is very low, despite the fact that the total number of business units 
concerned is similar in both countries. As a matter of fact, the number of small businesses 
registered as UTNP payers in Ukraine has increased more than tenfold in the period 1999-
2005, from 66.1 to 696.8 thousand, according to Lyutyi & Romanyuk (2007). 
Based on all this, we can conclude that the current structure of UTNP gives reaso-
nably good chances to boost tax competition among neighboring jurisdictions (local co-
mmunities) because the local discretion concerning tax rates is quite significant. On the 
other hand, a low local government share in tax proceeds (43 per cent of total UTNP and 
23 per cent of total UTLP proceeds, as noted above) and a low share of taxes in total re-
venues undermine incentives to manipulate it, while implementing own fiscal policies of8, 
either by raising or reducing tax rates in order to attract more taxpayers.
In fact, the analysis above suggests that local councils can apply a policy aimed at 
attracting small businesses to various types of economic activities carried out in the terri-
tories under their jurisdiction. This can be proven by the data on actual tax rates impo-
sed by local governments in the Ivano-Frankivsk region listed in the Annex. According 
to this information.
•   Tax rates for socially important activities are lower in comparison to those that tend 
to be more commercial. So the highest average tax rates are applied (in descending 
order) to wholesale trading, forestry and dentistry. By contrast, the lowest avera-
ge tax rates are applied (in ascending order) to shoe repair, production of wooden 
goods and souvenirs, and car passenger transport. It is likely that local councils try 
to increase the number of businesses which render services and produce goods for 
lower-income people.
8 These conclusions concerning any tax were theoretically proven by the author in his book published in 2002 
(see Slukhai 2002: 34-38).  60
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•   In rural areas, local councils tend not to care so much about attracting small busi-
nesses in the areas of activity which seem to be less developed. Surprisingly, rural 
districts hold ½ of the number of highest average tax rates for some activities, out 
of 26 listed in Annex. In addition, in many cases the highest UTNP rates imposed 
by rural councils differ greatly from those imposed by urban ones. However, the 
highest rates imposed by urban councils do not deviate so much from those impo-
sed by rural ones.
Another important observation about the behavior of both small businesses and local 
governments concerns some institutional peculiarities of the way in which the tax pro-
ceeds are being used. According to the Budget Code of Ukraine, this tax is included in the 
basket of revenues used for calculating the amounts of equalization grants. The revenu-
es mentioned above are supposed to fund the expenditures delegated by the state to local 
governments. This implies the following: (i) UT proceeds are not supposed to affect ex-
penditures on the local government own functions, (ii) a bigger amount of UT could ne-
gatively affect the size of the equalization grant of the respective local government in the 
next budget year; (iii) the basic structure of the tax (namely some degree of freedom in 
setting tax rates) contradicts its purpose, namely the funding of functions delegated by 
the state which must be performed nationwide in accordance with the relevant  standar-
ds, irrespective of location.
5 Tax competition evidence
5.1 Methodology
In order to trace the evidence of tax competition with regard to UTNP, the following 
hypothesis was put forward:
A negative correlation between an effective UTNP rate (otherwise defined as “ave-
rage tax-burden per tax-payer”) and the number of taxpayers observed suggests the pre-
sence of tax competition.9
Of course, one should not overstate the importance of such evidence, but there was 
no other possibility to prove the hypothesis because of lack of comprehensive data at the 
local level.
From a methodological point of view, several approaches and observations contai-
ned in empirical studies by different authors were considered important for the methodo-
logy employed: the correlation between tax rate and number of taxpayers as a measure 
of tax competition (Feld and Kirschgässner 2001); the negative correlation between lo-
cally set business tax rates and the amount of equalization grant received (Egger, Koet-
tenbuerger, Smart 2007).
In order to test the hypothesis stated above, two samples of cross-section data were 
examined and regressed. The first one consisted of 20 territorial units (6 urban councils 
9 A similar argument was used by Feld and Kirchgässner (2000), when the income tax competition in Switzer-
land was investigated.61
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and 14 rural districts) of the Ivano-Frankivsk region and the second one of 32 territorial 
units (6 urban councils and 26 rural districts) of the Vinnitsa region. 
The following data from 2006 was collected for analysis: (a) total revenues of combi-
ned district and city budgets; (b) proceeds from UTNP (used for computing the ‘effective 
UTNP rate’ for each jurisdiction because more detailed data on actual tax proceed cross-
section with regard of any specific tax was not available); (c) number of UTNP payers 
across territorial units; (d) number of local inhabitants.
The number of taxpayers was weighed against the size of population in order to rule 
out the influence of population density; this measure was transformed into “number of 
UTNP payers per 10,000 inhabitants”.
The effective UTNP rate was calculated by dividing the actual UTNP proceeds by the 
number of registered taxpayers. This procedure eliminates the structural differences in the 
areas of business activity throughout the regions which have some relevance as discussed 
in Section 3, but it gives a vision of aggregate fiscal behavior of local authorities towards 
small business units. We suppose that this measure truly reflects the trade-offs between 
fiscal and other motives in local government behavior.
Table 2 contains data on some characteristics of the two samples.
Table 2 Regional samples’ characteristics
Ivano-Frankivsk Vinnitsa
Number of cities of regional significance 5 6
Number of rural districts 14 27
Average population per territorial unit, in 1000 72.9 51.1
Average number of UTNP payers per territorial unit 1,527 898
Average effective UTNP rate per business   522 638
Minimum effective tax rate 337 399
Maximum effective tax rate 722 933
Tax rate variation coefficient 0.18 0.24
Source: authors’ calculation
Generally speaking, both samples demonstrate a very uneven territorial distribution 
of population, UTNP payers, and UTNP proceeds. The values demonstrate a high con-
centration of economic activity in the regions’ capitals – the cities of Ivano-Frankivsk and 
Vinnitsa. So the city of Ivano-Frankivsk accounts for 17.1 per cent of the regional popu-
lation, 32.8 per cent of UTNP payers, and 27.4 per cent of the UTNP proceeds, and the 
city of Vinnitsa 21.6, 37.1, and 42.0 per cent respectively. The concentration ratios are 
higher in the Vinnitsa region where cities are smaller in size in comparison to the Ivano-
Frankivsk region, due to deeper agricultural specialization of the regional economy. In 
terms of the theory summarized above, we must conclude that, given the wide variations 
among jurisdictions, there must be some room for tax rate variance. 62
S. Slukhai: Inter-Location Small Business Tax Rate Variation in Ukraine: What Is Behind It?
Financial Theory and Practice 33 (1) 49-71 (2009)
The above data suggests that the average effective UTNP base is far from the maxi-
mum (2,400 UAH per annum for a single business unit, excluding the cases when small 
businesses hire additional work force), standing at about 22 per cent of its maximum 
value in the Ivano-Frankivsk region and 26 per cent in the Vinnitsa region. This could 
signal that local authorities do not care much about maximizing the UTNP proceeds, as 
they rely on other sources of revenue. On the other hand, we can also assume that, by 
setting low tax rates, they try to attract more taxpayers to the region. The latter assump-
tion could be supported by a very significant difference between minimal and maximal 
effective rate values.
The samples also showed that rural districts are disadvantaged in terms of basic eco-
nomic indices in both regions. In the Ivano-Frankivsk region they comprise 65.5 per cent 
of the population, 49.4 per cent of UTNP payers, and 53.0 of the UTNP proceeds, and in 
Vinnitsa 69.6, 51.7, and 47.2 per cent respectively.
Such distribution of taxpayers and tax proceeds should not come as a surprise beca-
use urban areas are much more attractive for doing business than the rural ones, due to 
more concentrated consumer demand and network externalities.
In order to get a more reliable correlation, the samples of both regions were merged, 
because in each jurisdiction local governments set the UTNP rates autonomously within 
the margin determined by law, so the mere fact that a governmental unit belongs to a speci-
fic region does not influence the distribution of effective tax rates among jurisdictions.
In the model, the following theoretical assumptions concerning the interrelations 
between independent and dependent (“the number of UTNP payers per 10,000 of popu-
lation”) variables can be put forward:
1 The size of population in a respective community is supposed to have a positive ef-
fect on the number of UTNP payers for various reasons: (a) from the economic agents’ 
perspective, the positive effect of being in a bigger market outperforms the negative effect 
of higher tax rates, so private benefits derived from entering the market exceed the costs 
of funding public needs and increase the inflow of business units (we must also bear in 
mind that local the governments’ abilities to set tax rates are limited); (b) from the local 
governments’ perspective, the awareness of this situation creates a good opportunity for 
applying higher UTNP rates in bigger urban communities.
2 Since urban communities are usually more populous than rural ones, the former 
would attract more businesses despite the supposed higher tax rates.
3 The UTNP share is not neutral with respect to the number of small business units 
(taxpayers), but could also be ambivalent. We could suggest that, in order to have cete-
ris paribus larger UTNP proceeds (which could be a natural priority of any local gover-
nment) and, consequently, to have a bigger share in this revenue source, a hypothetic local 
government could pursue two alternative strategies: either raising the rates (and possibly 
losing a certain number of taxpayers), or reducing the rates (and possibly attracting an ad-
ditional number of taxpayers to its territory of jurisdiction). Having in mind the low mo-
bility of small businesses, we can assume that local governments would opt for the for-63
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mer type of strategy. That is why we assume that the correlation between the UTNP rate 
and the UTNP share is positive.
4 It would also be natural to assume a negative correlation between the equalization 
grant share and the number of taxpayers. In Ukraine, there is a general consensus among 
economists concerning disincentives for tax revenue collection generated by the current 
equalization system10.
5 The effective UTNP rate is (according to p. 3 above) negatively correlated with the 
number of taxpayers. 
These assumptions were tested on the multiple regression models presented below.
5.2 Results and interpretation
In the merged sample, the dependent variable (“number of small business units per 
10,000 of population”) was regressed with regard to the following factors (independent 
variables): “number of inhabitants”, “type of territorial unit” (dummy variable), “UTNP 
share in local revenues”, “equalization grant share in local revenues”, and “effective 
UTNP rate”.  
The OLS multiple regression results are presented in Table 3 below (Model 1).11
Table 3   Multiple regression results for the dependent variable “number of unified 
small business tax for natural persons payers per 10,000 of population”
 Coefficients Standard  error t-statistics
Y-intercept 180.142 74.938 2.403
Population 0.00012 0.0002 0.455
Dummy for rural (0) or urban (1) locations 93.491 38.339 2.438
UTNP share in local revenues 529.367 393.277 1.346
Equalization grant share in local revenues -0.001 0.132 -0.009
Effective UTNP rate (UAH per annum) -0.089 0.119 -0.753
Standard error 104.751 X X
N5 2 X X
R2 0.198 X X
Source: authors’ calculation
The regression presented in Table 3 produced some quite interesting results. Most 
of them supported the theoretical deliberations stated above. But we need to be cautio-
us in interpreting the results with a low value of R2 and insignificant values of some co-
efficients.
10 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see e.g. Lunina (2006) and Tarangul (2003).
11 The testing of Models 1 and 2 for heteroscedasticity (white test) showed negative results.64
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1   There is a positive (though insignificant) correlation between the size of population 
and the number of small businesses. This is also strengthened by the quite signifi-
cant influence that the administrative unit type has on the number of businesses; the 
coefficient demonstrates that urban locations attract small businesses much more 
intensively than rural ones. 
2   The UTNP share is positively correlated with the number of UTNP payers. This 
observation should not be very surprising because the higher the number of tax-
payers under the employed flat rate approach, the higher the proceeds from the re-
venue source and its share.
3   Equalization grants discourage local activity aimed at attracting potential UTNP 
payers. Such conclusion goes in line with observations carried out by Egger, Koe-
tenbuerger and Smart (2007) who conducted a study on how equalization grants af-
fect local business tax rates in Lower Saxony, Germany. They found out that incre-
ases in local business tax rates would reduce the respective tax base, which in turn 
would increase a local government’s entitlement to equalization grant. Therefore, 
local governments may deliberately decrease the local tax base by increasing the 
tax burden with a view to obtaining larger funds from the higher-level government. 
This phenomenon could be better understood if we take into account the equalizati-
on approach employed in Ukraine: according to the Budget Code and Methodolo-
gy on Calculating the Equalization Donation Amount (Kabinet Ministriv Ukrayiny, 
2003), the UTPP proceeds are included in the revenue basket used for calculating 
the equalization grant amount. So, if the amount of UTNP is larger due to lower 
rates, the amount of equalization grant for the next year must be lower. Taking into 
account the fact that equalization grants account for a significant share of revenues 
in both regions, the local governments try to minimize the risk of lowering transfers 
and prefer not to pursue an aggressive fiscal policy by enlarging the number of tax-
payers because it will make them fiscally worse-off. This issue of disincentive ef-
fects of the transfer policy was emphasized by many Ukrainian researchers.12
4   Increasing the effective UTNP rate reduces the number of taxpayers. Unfortuna-
tely, this correlation is not very significant statistically. Otherwise it could be a very 
important observation which would mean that the local tax burden matters when 
small businesses make decisions on business location. It could also be further in-
terpreted in the following way: local governments can, through their tax rate deci-
sions, attract bigger or smaller numbers of small businesses. Nevertheless, as con-
cerns UTNP, there seems to be some room for horizontal tax competition among 
jurisdictions. 
The last statement should also be weighed against the realities of the Ukrainian transi-
tion economy. The fact is that many small entrepreneurs are doing business illegally, wit-
hout registration and paying taxes, even though the UTNP rates are relatively low compa-
red with the world-wide experience. Pursuing seasonal activities, many private entrepre-
neurs are not willing to pay a fixed amount of tax all year long. That is why we could in-
terpret this correlation as the presence of potential competition among local governments 
12 See Ohon (2006) and Lunina (2006).65
S. Slukhai: Inter-Location Small Business Tax Rate Variation in Ukraine: What Is Behind It?
Financial Theory and Practice 33 (1) 49-71 (2009)
concerning the legalization of small business units. If we make a reasonable assumption 
that net returns in a small-scale business do not differ much from the average disposable 
income per capita, then we can understand why local governments try to keep the UTNP 
rate low in order not to discourage legal entrepreneurial activity: in 2006, average annual 
disposable income per capita was 6,577 UAH in the Ivano-Frankivsk region, and 7,145 
UAH in the Vinnitsa region (Ministerstvo Finansiv Ukrayiny 2007). Imposing UTNP at 
a maximum rate would be equivalent to 34-36 per cent of effective PIT rate in any region 
which is very high. Therefore, we can state the following: as such, local fiscal policy with 
regard to UTNP could not deeply affect the number of legally operating incumbents, but 
it could affect the number of businesses officially registered as taxpayers. 
It turned out that a low value of R2 for the merged sample was generated by a low 
correlation between dependent and independent variables for rural localities. That is why 
we had reasons to test a regression for the more homogenous sample of urban localities.
The linear multiple regression in Model 2 (see Table 4) showed a much higher value 
of R2, which means that the correlations are more reliable in comparison to the previous 
one, and demonstrated quite a significant negative correlation between the number of tax-
payers and the effective UTNP rate. Accordingly, a 10 UAH rise in the effective UTNP 
rate will generate a decrease in the number of small business units registered in a juris-
diction by at least 4.
Table 4   Regression results for the dependent variable “number of unified small 
business tax for natural persons payers per 10,000 of population in urban 
localities”
  Coefficients Standard error t-statistics
Y-intercept 476.013 101.665 4.594
Population 0.0004 0.000 2.013
UTNP share in local revenues -110.787 492.121 -0.225
Equalization grant share in local revenues 0.716 1.500 0.477
Effective UTNP rate (UAH per annum) -0.437 0.193 -2.264
Standard error 56.006 X X
N1 1 X X
R2 0.668 X X
Source: authors’ calculation
So we can present the results in the following way: for urban localities, a negative re-
action of the number of registered small businesses to an increase in UTNP rates is obser-
ved. With a low number of observations in a sample, we can make a cautious guess: local 
decision-making on small business taxation could have an impact on the number of re-
gistered taxpayers in urban areas. At least we could think that the evidence of horizontal 
fiscal competition is much stronger here as compared to the merged sample; or, in other 66
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words, urban localities have stronger incentives to use tax rate variation as an instrument 
of own revenue mobilization.
The other regression coefficients also showed a stronger interdependence between de-
pendent and independent variables, especially for the “effective UTNP rate” and “equali-
zation grant share in local revenues”. It must be noted that both variables appeared to be 
much more influential in case of urban localities in comparison to the whole sample.
As concerns the “equalization grant share” variable, the reason for such a difference 
between the value of the regression coefficient and the one presented in the previous model 
(Table 3) could be a much higher dependence of rural localities (which comprise about 80 
per cent of the observed units) on equalization grants and lower shares of UTNP proceeds 
in their budgets: the grant share here is about 85-90 per cent. By contrast, it is only 30-40 
per cent with much higher differentiation among individual territorial units for urban lo-
calities; the average UTNP share is about three per cent in rural localities, but about five 
per cent in urban ones. So, in the whole sample, the properties of rural local governments 
offset those of the urban ones. The positive sign of the correlation coefficient for urban 
communities can be interpreted in the following way: the larger quantity of public servi-
ces provided by urban communities funded by equalization grants offsets the disadvan-
tages of being heavily taxed. This fact suggests that vertical fiscal competition interacts 
with the horizontal one and could be used as a means of attracting new taxpayers. 
The fact of small businesses’ reaction to the UTNP rate variation leaves open the que-
stion on whether the local governments actually use the tax instrument in question in order 
to attract more taxpayers. This question could be answered after a more detailed analysis 
with more comprehensive data sets involved. The time series analysis would give some 
useful insights into this matter.
The low value of R2 in the case of a merged set of observations could signal that there 
is something wrong with the local government’s fiscal behavior. We can guess that eco-
nomic rationale for such behavior could be the fact that UT proceeds are allocated to the 
revenue basket intended for funding delegated functions. Another fact contributing to 
such behavior is the sharing of tax proceeds. To sum up, the local governments feel that 
there is no need to care much about the UTNP administration, because there are much 
more attractive and cost-effective options. The statement could be supported by an esti-
mation of UTNP revenue potential. E.g. in the Ivano-Frankivsk region, according to the 
local property census 2007, there are about 6,000 tractors and 9,000 horses in the priva-
te possession. It is no secret that these means of production are often used to render ser-
vices against payment to other private persons to satisfy their agricultural and transporta-
tion needs, but as a matter of fact 71 per cent of tractor owners and 93 per cent of horse 
owners are not registered as small entrepreneurs and do not pay any taxes at all. Should 
the local authorities manage to have all the tractor and horse owners registered and pay 
UTNP at the minimum rate (UAH 240 a year), which would really not be not burdenso-
me for micro entrepreneurs, this would produce about UAH 3 million of additional inco-
me for local governments in rural areas which accounts for about 25 per cent of the cu-
rrent UT proceeds of rural councils. And this is just a small example of a missed oppor-
tunity to generate revenues from UTNP.67
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Generally speaking, both regressions show quite a low significance of some coeffici-
ents and low reliability of predictions, especially in the case of the second one, due to the 
low number of observations. That is why the predictions of both models must be taken 
with high caution and not overstated. Based on them, we cannot state that the Ukrainian 
local finance system really gives rise to tax competition; we can only say that, under the 
current conditions, there are some prerequisites for the emergence of tax competition. In 
this case, an estimation of the factors which control the tax competition variable could be 
very useful to establish whether horizontal tax competition would encourage or reduce the 
public sector efficiency. From our perspective, the institutional changes could be the most 
influential ones here, but they are difficult to capture in econometric analysis.  
We can surmise that the allocation of the UTNP to the basket of revenues that are not 
taken into account for calculating the amount of equalization grant could change the fis-
cal behavior of local governments. It could make them more aggressive in maintaining 
the taxpayers’ discipline and increase propensity to use tax rates for attracting taxpayers 
and hence expanding their own tax base because in this case it will not affect the amo-
unt of equalization grant received. If this shift in local revenue composition is supported 
by expanding the rate schedule (we think that the current schedule should be revised due 
to current economic conditions, especially given the cumulative inflation rate of over 60 
per cent since 1998), we can expect much stronger manifestations of fiscal competition 
with regard to UTNP.
According to some research papers concerning Russian municipalities (Bestremya-
nnaya, 2001), one could expect a more substantial role of fiscal competition under the fo-
llowing conditions: greater responsibility for public services, greater autonomy in revenue 
raising and greater accountability of local authorities. The same could be true especially 
for the Ukrainian local governments which seem to be set to gain more autonomy in the 
nearest future, as suggested by the recent developments in the Ukrainian public sector: 
the central government, being unable to prevent a decline in local revenues and deteriora-
tion of locally operated public service infrastructure as a result of global recession which 
sharply hit the Ukrainian economy in 2008, seems now to be more eager to unleash local 
fiscal initiatives through granting greater fiscal autonomy to territorial communities.
6 Conclusion
The Ukrainian local revenue system does not give much room for horizontal fis-
cal competition among localities; this finding is not surprising for a country with a hig-
hly centralized public sector. Nowadays, as the local property tax is still not implemen-
ted, the best possible area for tax competition is the UTNP, which is structured in a way 
that allows local governments to use this revenue instrument for attracting a greater num-
ber of taxpayers and, consequently, generate more revenue for funding the expenditures 
on local delivery of public goods. This conclusion stems from the fact that local gover-
nments are granted some discretion in setting tax rates. On the other hand, this possibi-
lity is weakened by a low sharing rate applied to this revenue source (which contradicts 
the right of taking decisions on the rates) and high local government dependence on state 
equalization grants.68
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Following the theoretical approaches summed up in Section 2, we see that tax com-
petition in Ukraine is heavily limited by the central government which neglects the issue 
of voluntary tax coordination at the local level. That is why its fiscal externalities are of 
a small scale and they are offset by equalization grants serving as a major source of fun-
ding for communities, especially in rural areas. The issue of accountability does not play 
a significant role because of weak local institutions and high shares of external revenues 
in local governments’ budgets. For the local governments, vertical fiscal competition, es-
pecially as concerns state grants, seems to be more important because it results in much 
more substantial revenue gains.   
Despite all these “buts”, there is a negative correlation between the number of small 
business units registered as taxpayers and the effective UTNP rate found, which is a clear 
evidence of competition among jurisdictions, aiming at attracting a greater number of tax-
payers. In this competition, urban locations are likely to have an advantage over the rural 
ones. The regression results obtained must be interpreted very cautiously due to the pro-
blem of the number of observations, but, nevertheless, they give some grounds for discu-
ssion about whether such competition could not burst in the nearest future when instituti-
onal changes are introduced into the current intergovernmental structure. 
We suppose that such competition could become noticeable in case the national gover-
nment decides to widen the gap between the minimum and maximum UTNP rates (some 
intentions to do so in the face of the deepening recession, and the consequential decline 
in revenues have been announced). At the moment, the floor tax rate of 20 UAH (about 2 
Euro), or even the ceiling rate of 200 UAH (20 Euro) per month approved in 1998 seems 
ridiculous, taking into account the fact that many small businesses earn quite substantial 
amounts of money. Another factor which could contribute to this issue is the re-shifting 
of functions in favor of the basic-level local governments and making UTNP an own re-
venue source, thus excluding it from the revenue sources taken into account for the cal-
culation of equalization grants and from the sharing procedure. This kind of policy would 
raise the motivation of local governments for expanding the revenue base and strengthen 
their desire to compete for taxpayers. A new real opportunity for competition could arise 
with the adoption of legislation on local property taxation, which would grant significant 
tax rate discretion to the local governments. The relevant legal acts are still on the agen-
da of the Ukrainian Parliament.
How close are these developments to reality? Actually, almost all the leading political 
forces in Ukraine support the idea of strong local self-government and, consequently, of 
transferring fiscal authority to lower government levels. Sooner or later the Constitution 
will be amended to allow for these changes13 and local governments will have larger fis-
cal discretion. Then we could expect much sharper competition for taxpayers among ju-
risdictions. Along with changes in administrative and territorial composition (the size of 
territorial communities must be increased to 5,000 inhabitants instead of the current 500 
on average in rural areas), the local dependence on equalization grants will be minimized, 
which will also contribute to fiscal competition. In order to minimize harmful manifesta-
13 Until the end of 2008, there existed several constitutional draft laws advocated by different political parties. 
It is highly possible that in 2009, the legislators will reach a consensus and, as a result, the decentralization process 
will really start.69
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tions of tax competition and possible economic distortions, the central government has 
to retain control over defining the tax base and capping the UTNP rates along with intro-
ducing specific ceiling rates for different types of economic activities and facilitating the 
setup of local community institutions.
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